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Conservative Russia

Vladimir Pachkov, SJ - La Civiltà Cattolica - Thu, Jun 10th 2021

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“Russia needs to be frozen”: these words, which are attributed to a 19th century thinker and also to a government official, best express the current intentions of those wielding power and of conservative ideologues in Russia.

During the inauguration of a monument dedicated to Czar Alexander III – who on March 13, 1881, had succeeded the reformer Alexander II, killed by leftist terrorists – Putin claimed  that he himself had given Russia 13 years of peace, not by making concessions, but by his firmness.[1]

Today, as in the 19th century, there is a convergence, on one side, of political interests looking to keep the government in power, and on the other side, some intellectuals who believe that conservative values constitute the essence of civilization in Russia. Those who have studied Russian history and are now observing its developments may feel a sense of déjà-vu, especially if one takes the government’s rhetoric seriously. How serious is this return to the old values? Or does something else lie behind it?

It is interesting to note that in Russia not only the support for the government, but also the fiercest opposition to it does not come from the liberals, but from the conservatives, for whom Putin is certainly preferable to Yeltsin and his liberals, although thought to be too “pro-Western” and too “pragmatic.” However, the interaction between ideologues – particularly conservatives – and the government is not a straightforward matter. If the government is accused by the conservative ideologues of being too pragmatic or even too pro-Western, this particular ideology is nevertheless chosen by the government as the main tool to stabilize society. And this stabilization serves not only to maintain the elite in power, but also to affect the modernization of the country.

 

A conservative protest movement?

We hear a lot about the anti-Putin protest movement in Russia, which is also directed against his government. Its demand, “Away with power!” and its ideas for the future are, to put it mildly, varied, ranging from the establishment of a Western-style “liberal democracy” to ultra-nationalism. If you follow the reports in non-Russian media about events in Russia, especially the protests, you might get the impression that the majority of the population – or at least a very large part of it – are supporters of “liberal democracy,” and that they are oppressed by the corrupt government.

One may or may not agree with the expression “corrupt government” – and by “government” we mean all those who are part of state power and state finances – but not the idea of a liberal civil society (especially outside of some large cities, notably Moscow and St. Petersburg). The real alternatives to the current government are not the liberals, but the communists and the ultra-nationalists of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), who assert themselves in the elections, especially in the provinces, against Putin’s governing United Russia party.

In addition, protesters represent a very small part of the population. It may be that fear of state repression also contributes to this. But the main reason why people do not take to the streets to call for changes is because they fear them. Even at the end of Yeltsin’s rule, most of the population had a classical liberal attitude, especially in the field of the economy. The failure of the 2005 mini-reforms – for example, that of the monetization of the social security system, aimed at converting the numerous forms of social benefits into monetary terms – led to an even more convinced rejection of reforms. It is understandable that ordinary people reject any change, for they have suffered most from the often badly implemented reforms. If it is an alternative to the status quo, then it seems that for most people it is not in support of the idea of freedom and personal responsibility, but something else.

Trust in the “strong state” and the idea of “justice” have so far played a much more important role than the idea of freedom and the autonomy of the citizen, not only among the mass of the population, but also among the representatives of the educated class, the so-called “intelligentsiya.” Among intellectuals in Russia, many are sympathetic to “real” power. It is not that they close their eyes to the problems – in particular that of corruption – but rather, like the great leader of the government and reformer Stolypin, who was killed by an anarchist in 1911, they say: “The others need great upheavals, we need a great Russia.” Also, somewhat differently from the advocates of liberal democracy, they believe that it is not human rights and the progress of individual citizens that are important to the country, but a strong state.

Conservative ideology, which still played a subordinate role in the modern Russia of the 1990s, has become increasingly important, especially since the Ukrainian crisis of 2014-15, partly because it is supported by the Russian government. But not only that. This return was possible because the conservative ideology has been deeply rooted in Russian history and in the mentality of the population, and it still is, despite the fact that there has been in the way of thinking, especially of young people, a rapprochement with Western values. In most of the population conservative values are not present in attitudes toward the family (divorces are frequent, children are few) or religion, but toward the state.

Thus we are faced with a paradox: on the one hand, there is little trust in the state, which for many is only an institution through which “servants of the state” have been able to enrich themselves at public expense; on the other hand, the state must appear powerful to the outside world, but must also – what is even more important for the ordinary citizen – be a paternalistic state and guarantee social security.

Tradition also plays an important role, and here by “tradition” we mean the ways of thinking and acting that are passed down from generation to generation in the process of socialization. An example of this is the informal solving of problems through corruption rather than through justice. Despite all the radical changes and revolutions, these patterns have endured uninterruptedly for centuries.

The problem with traditional ideology is the fact that, as has often been the case in Russian history, it focuses on a charismatic personality rather than institutions. This is a story as old as Russia itself. In his work Conversation Piece, 1945, Vladimir Nabokov uses the words of a former White Army colonel to express his attitude toward the state, and, in particular, toward the head of state: “The great Russian people have awakened and my country has become a great country again. We have had three great leaders. We had Ivan, whom his enemies called ‘the Terrible’; then Peter ‘the Great,’ and now we have Stalin. I am a ‘white’ and I served in the Guard, but I am also a Russian patriot and a Russian Christian. Today, in every word that comes from Russia I feel power, I feel the glory of the ancient mother Russia. It has once again become the land of soldiers, religion and true Slavs.”

It is shocking to see – although this is understandable from a psychological point of view, since these statements were made immediately after the victory in the most terrible war experienced by the Russian population (1940-45) – how much of the destruction in Russia itself, for which the Bolsheviks and Stalin personally were responsible, in the eyes of this colonel was nothing compared to the force projected by the state.

Such ideas are widespread in Russia even today. The majority of the people, who share them and at the same time support the policies of the government, were formed after the traumatic experiences of perestroika and the 1990s. They are characterized by paternalistic attitudes, rejection of the free market and uncritical patriotism.

The turn from the “liberalism” that shaped the official debate in the 1990s, to conservatism practically ended during the Ukrainian crisis of 2014-15. This debate was determined by the equating of civilization and state. Everything else – history, culture, morals, traditions – is absorbed into the theory of “state civilization.” The state defends these values, but it defends above all its own independence. The idea of state sovereignty remains, from 2014 to the present, the main thread of Russian foreign policy, as well as of speeches addressed to the Russian people along the lines of: “We will not be subjugated.”[2]

In order to understand the paradoxes of modern Russian society it should be noted that although military power and the reputation of the state are considered important, people themselves believe that well-being and economic development are fundamental elements of a strong and efficient state and society. This is even more true for people’s behavior in everyday life. While Russian society is ideologically conservative and anti-Western in its conception of the state and its role in the world, it is pragmatically oriented toward personal well-being and ever-increasing consumption. For this reason, just as in China, it is difficult to expect that economic growth and integration will necessarily lead to a change of attitudes in the sense of “liberal democracy,” an issue which we have already discussed.

After the “troubled times” of the 20th century, which began with the first revolution in 1905 and continued until the end of the century, Russians no longer desire troubled times in the 21st century. While they are aware that the country needs changes, they know from experience that the prerequisite for such necessary reforms is a strong government, not revolution and chaos. It is extremely important for Russia that this state remain stable and that transformations proceed by small steps.

It should also be noted that in state policy one can recognize not only the aspiration to stability, but also a certain obscurantism. An example of this is the law on education, which Parliament seems determined to pass.[3] This also shows the division present in the ruling political class itself. There are many who believe that Russia should be “frozen” very deeply. But one wonders: if the first attempt in the 19th century ended with the October Revolution, the second with the collapse of the USSR, will the third succeed?[4]

Conservative ideology in post-Soviet Russia

Although the political situation in Russia remains relatively stable, attempts to establish or devise a new ideology of the state, or an idea behind which the government can unite the majority of the population in the way it wants to, have failed to take hold. The ideology of conservatism remains one of the most important sources for this purpose.

Very often conservative ideologies are linked with Soviet history and previously dominant ideology. These ideologies emerged in the 1990s as an alternative to the liberal policy (at least in theory) of the Yeltsin government. Their common element was statism, the best expression of which was found in Prokhanov’s “fifth state” theory. This writer advocated the creation of a new empire, which was to gather the legacy of the traditions of Kievan Rus, the Empire of the Moscow czars, the Russian Empire and the USSR. Since Putin has also used the rhetoric of the reconstitution of the strong state, these ideas have become part of government discourse.

In present-day Russia there are three types of conservatism, all based on the idea of a strong state: “Soviet,” “imperial” and “Euro-Asian” conservatism.

While drawing inspiration from the time of the USSR, the advocates of Soviet conservatism condemn everything they call “left-wing ideology” (the destruction of the state and family values), while extolling the “right-wing elements” that had asserted themselves particularly strongly in Stalin’s time (the restoration of the former Russian Empire and its borders, the strengthening of the family, and a certain reconciliation with the Church). For the representatives of this current ideology, the Soviet Union was a necessary continuation in the development of Russian civilization. All that was negative in it, they attributed to Marxism, which was incompatible with the Russian reality. The Soviet Union as a civilization did not come into being because of Marxist ideology, but in spite of it. Soviet conservatism arose after the collapse of the USSR, but without Marxist rhetoric.

The liberal ideology that prevailed in Russia in the 1990s – at least in the rhetoric of the government at the time – has all but disappeared from both official discourse and public discourse in general. There was probably too much freedom without order. It did not go well. But now both the government and the opposition swear by the ideology of conservatism. However, this does not mean that both – the government and the conservative opposition – mean the same thing when they talk about conservatism.

It seems that President Putin and the government use conservative discourse to achieve tangible policy goals, including modernizing the country, but under strong leadership, and restoring social order (state, family, religion). They are criticized not for being too conservative, but for not being conservative enough.

Where does this criticism come from and what does the conservative opposition in Russia really want, should it come to power? Looking more closely, one may be surprised and observe the unlikely synthesis between Soviet ideology and the ideology of the Czarist Empire.

Euro-Asianism arose in the 1920s after the Bolsheviks came to power as a reaction to it. It insisted on the affinity of history and destiny between Russia, the Turkic peoples and the Mongols, and the close connection between the Mongol Empire, the Golden Horde and the Russian Empire. In this perspective, Russia is not only the state that succeeded Byzantium and a country of Slavs, but also the nation that bears within itself the “spirit of the steppe.” The ideological project of the current followers of this thinking consists of a mixture of mysticism and geopolitics. As for the economic aspect, the followers of this ideology call their proposals “the third way” between Marxism and liberalism.[5]

Common to all currents of Russian conservatism is the fact that they emphasize the profound differences between Russia and Europe (even with respect to Orthodox Slavs living in Europe). These differences cannot be overcome, especially on the cultural level. Even the integration of Eastern Europe into the sphere of influence of the USSR after World War II, although understandable from the geopolitical point of view, had no future prospects, because it was not possible to reconcile the culture of Eastern Europe with that of Russia.[6]

The three currents have in common not only the fact that they strictly separate Russia from Europe from the point of view of civilization, but also their attitude to the state: the defense of authoritarianism, which should be one of the most important features of Russian (Euro-Asian) civilization, is seen as a value in itself. According to them, “anti-statism” is the cause of many of Russia’s political and economic problems.[7] The state also plays an important role in the formation and maintenance of a nation; that is why the state boundaries separating one people from another are so important.[8]

The most significant negative development of today’s political situation in Russia is the destruction of hierarchy and traditions.[9] As for the relations between the ideologies of conservatism and political power, they appear complex. On the one hand, Putin is supported as a symbol of traditional authoritarianism; on the other hand, many conservative ideologues see in his government strong elements of pragmatism and orientation toward the Western model: “Putin’s concept of statehood corresponds to the European model of the nation-state. For Putin, only the formal aspects of the state are important; to everything else he attaches no importance or simply does not know it. For him, the state is a technical construction.”[10]

This is surprising, because for advocates of Western democracy the Russian state and government are too much based on ideology (and they do not hide this search for a state ideology), while for ideologues of conservatism the state and government in Russia are still too “Europeanized,” too pragmatic and, unlike the Russian Empire and the USSR, “not ideological.” “Everywhere we see technology and pragmatism. However, this is not the Russian way, but rather the European way.”[11]

Yet on the part of the government there is no contradiction between the strengthening of its political power and its liberal and pragmatic policy in the economic field. In developing countries, which follow a process of economic transformation, authoritarianism is a guarantee of stability in the course of economic transformation. Not only the development, but also the maintenance of the society as such depends on the cohesion of its members. The pursuit of an ideology not only satisfies the desire to maintain power on the part of those who hold it, but also performs a positive function for the entire people. Although it is impossible for everyone to accept the same ideology, it is understandable that society as such may find a common basis useful. Conservatism – because it represents an alternative to both the leftist ideology, which has dominated in Russia in the form of Marxism, and to Western liberalism – claims to attract the majority of Russian society to itself, thus creating a basis for development.

The conservative project of modernizing Russia assumes that the cultural tradition of the country will be maintained. The most important thing in such a project is gradual development through reforms, and not through a revolution, even if it means accepting the mistakes and problems of the current political system.

This kind of conservatism has in common with liberalism the fact that both accept the market economy and want to avoid state intervention in the economic sector as much as possible. However, for conservatism, social collaboration plays a much more important role than for liberalism.[12] Of course, authoritarianism in itself cannot guarantee modernization. For this there is a need for political will and a corresponding program. On the other hand, there seems to be a strong consensus that the state – one could say the authoritarian state – in Russia and other countries of the former USSR, is an indispensable condition for such modernization. The government sees the different ideologies – even conservatism – only as a means to achieve the goal of economic and military modernization of the state; it uses conservative ideology to the extent that its ideas are useful to that end. The Russian political scientist Aleksandr Dugin says that the current government in Russia is simply pragmatic and uses anything that may be useful for its purposes.[13]

It is clear that this ideology, like any other, is far removed from the way most of the population sees it. But it expresses much better than liberal ideology what can be called “a collective subconscious of the people.” In Russia the public discourse is dominated by those who look back nostalgically to the past: both to the Russia of the czars and to the time when the country was ruled by the murderers of the czars. This is demonstrated by the request – made by 45 percent of the population, according to the survey on the official website of Moscow[14] – to rebuild, in the center of the capital, the monument to Felix Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky (1877-1926), founder of the Soviet secret police (the ?eka), although the mayor rejected this proposal, considering it divisive for society,[15] and the president’s spokesperson termed it a “provocation.”[16]

Liberals are often called “unpatriotic” because they are pro-Western. The dispute over the monument to Dzerzhinsky is a symptom of the need that the government in its work must resist the pressure of conservatives more than that of liberals, and it also shows that, if changes are expected in Russia, they will lead the country in a direction other than democracy according to the Western model.

[1].    Cf. ??????? ???????, “???????? ?????: ???????? III ??? ?????? 13 ??? ???? ?? ?????????, ? ???????????? ? ????????????? ??????????”. ??. (https://www.kp.ru/daily/26759.5/3789619), November 18, 2017.

[2].    ?????????? ??????, “?????????? ????????? ????? ?????. ??????? ????????????? ? ???????????” (https://carnegie.ru/2015/07/07/ru-pub-60606), July 7, 2015.

[3].    Cf. ????????? ????, “????????????? ?? ???? ????????”, in ?????????? (https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4701693), February 21, 2021.

[4].    Cf. ??????? ??????, “?????? ???? ???????????…”, in ?????????? (https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2296484), February 5, 2006.

[5].    Cf. “????????? ???????????? ??????” ???????”. ???. ???. ?. ?. ??????, ?. ?. ????????. ?. “???????-?????”, 2012, ?. 84.

[6]  .   Cf. ??????? ?. ?. “??????. ??? XX. (1939-1964)”. ?.: ?????; ????????., 2005, ?. 528.

[7]  .   Cf. ????-?????, “???????? ? ???? ?? ?????”. ?. ?????, 2002, ?. 256

[8]  .   Cf. Id. “???????? ??????”. M.: ????????, 2007, ?. 704

[9]  .   Cf. Id. “???????????? – ?????? ???????? ?????????????”. M.: ?????, 2002, ?. 256.

[10].   ????? ?. ?., “????? ???????? ?? ????????? ??????? ??????”, in http://evrazia.org/article/1868

[11].   Ibid.

[12].   Cf. ??????? ????? ??????????. “???????? ??????????? ?????????????? ????????? ? ?? ???????????????? ? ??????????? ?????????? ????????”. ????????? ??????????????? ???????????. ?????????, 2016, in https://kubsu.ru/sites/default/files/users/14472/portfolio/kursovaya_rabota.pdf

[13].   Cf. ???????? ?. ?., ?????a ?. ?. “?????????????? ? ?????????????? ???????? ???????????????? ??????????. ??????? ??????????”, 2015, 4 (35) https://www.elibrary.ru/contents.asp?selid=25596171&issueid=1559733

[14].   Cf “???????? ?????????? ??????? ????? ??????????? ? ????????? ?? ???????”, in https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/603937249a794791e2cfbd2c

[15].   Cf. “?????? ?????? ?????????? ?? ????????? ????????? ?? ????????? ???????”, in https://www.dw.com/ru/vlasti-moskvy-otkazalis-otustanovki-pamjatnika-na-lubjanskoj-ploshhadi/a-56720114

[16].   ?????? ??????, ??????????? ?????? “?????? ?????? ?????????????? ?????? ? ????????? ???????????? ?? ???????”, in https://pub.wikireading.ru/29383

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