Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo

For almost 25 years, the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has continued to make headlines for the large number of civilian victims and refugees. Today, the province of North Kivu has become the powder keg of Central Africa, trapped by a regional system of conflicts that has made Congo “the rape capital of the world.”[1] The murders of human rights activists, journalists and opinion makers and, more recently, of Italian ambassador Luca Attanasio, are just some examples that clearly demonstrate how insecurity in the eastern part of the DRC is more problematic than ever.

Beyond the visceral reactions that this sad reality may provoke, it is time to reflect, with clarity and serenity, to understand why the solutions that have been proposed and implemented so far to get the DRC out of this crisis have not produced the desired results. We can therefore ask ourselves why armed conflict persists there. Is the humanitarian aid provided to this tormented country succeeding in protecting the most vulnerable and in meeting the needs of the population in danger? What can be done to restore peace and stability in eastern Congo after long years of war?

To answer these questions, we will first show how the particular conflicted and complex picture of the war in DR Congo must be seen as inseparable from the functioning of social and political structures in the country, as well as the consequences of the genocide in Rwanda and the two Congolese wars (1996-97 and 1998-2002). Then we will question as to the reasons why the humanitarian aid given to the Congolese to restore peace in their country has not produced the desired results. Finally, we will propose, as a solution to get Congo out of the quagmire into which it has sunk, an inclusive dialogue for peace, like that of the Sovereign National Conference of 1990-92.

History of a war with many faces

The DRC became independent on June 30, 1960, with the promise of a bright future because of the many favorable elements it enjoyed: an immense national territory, good quality arable land, a growing population and important natural resources. The Congolese  inhabit a country situated on the equator, with an area of 2,345,903 square kilometers.[2] This territory, crossed by the majestic Congo River,[3] offered, and still offers, many opportunities for agriculture, livestock farming, fishing. With more than 35 percent of the land arable and fertile, large fresh water reserves, considerable rainfall in a hot and humid climate, Lumumba’s[4] country was clearly in a better situation than many other newly independent states.

More than 60 years after its independence, Congo is a country in tatters, whose inhabitants are, for the most part, reduced to extreme poverty. Furthermore, it was on Congolese soil that what some call the “First African World War” took place, due to the involvement of the armies of a dozen countries. This war, which took place in two phases – from 1996 to 1997 and from 1998 to 2003 (for others, from 1998 to today) – has caused the deaths of several million people, especially civilians. This is the highest number of deaths in a conflict since the end of World War II. Why did this happen?

It must be recognized that the DRC is a textbook case whose problems cannot be reduced to a simplistic explanation. Whatever approach or angle one wishes to take with this sad reality, the consequences of the genocide that shook Rwanda in 1994 are among the main keys to interpretation. In fact, after the genocide that killed more than 800,000 people, thousands of Rwandan refugees crossed the border from Rwanda into DR Congo. Among them were several perpetrators of the genocide who had killed unscrupulously in Rwanda. In the Congo, they used the refugee camps as bases from which they would eventually carry out incursions into Rwanda.

This is why the new Rwandan government, led by Paul Kagame, and his friend and ally at the time, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, saw such people as a continuing danger to their countries. A Rwandan military intervention quickly resolved the problem in December 1996. Buoyed by their success, the Rwandan and Ugandan forces set their sights on another goal: overthrowing the regime of President Mobutu.[5] In 1997, their candidate, Laurent-Désiré Kabila, and his AFDL movement (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo) captured the capital, Kinshasa and ousted Mobutu. The coup d’état was facilitated by the Congolese population, who wanted no more of the dictator, since his government had brought the country to an unprecedented political and economic state of collapse.[6]

Once in power, Kabila tried to get rid of those who had supported him. It was then that a bloody struggle for power began. Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi armed the anti-Kabila Congolese rebels, waging a proxy war, or hiding behind them to operate freely. The eastern Congo, rich in mineral resources, thus became a new Wild West, an open-air slaughterhouse. In Kinshasa, after escaping an assassination attempt on July 27, 1998, Kabila decided to dismiss his Rwandan military advisors. This act was the beginning of the so-called “Second Congo War,” which broke out on August 2, 1998.

Rebel movements, supported by Rwanda and Uganda, rapidly multiplied.[7] Kabila did not have an army capable of dealing with them. Despite the support of Angola and Zimbabwe, concerned  to save his regime, he was mysteriously and tragically assassinated on January 16, 2001.

The Congo bears the heavy burden of its history

It is clear that this proliferation of armed groups has seriously affected DR Congo, especially the east of the country, where armed gangs have looted, raped and killed women and children. Even today, militias, particularly Rwandan militias, sow terror and desolation in eastern Congo. “To justify the presence of its army in Congo, Kigali has always put forward security pretexts, including , the need to identify those responsible for genocide. In reality, other interests guide its actions: the desire to exploit the resources of eastern Congo, a dream of territorial expansion and, in addition, the ambition to place in Kinshasa a friendly, if not submissive, administration.”[8] Otherwise, how do you explain the fact that Rwanda is the world’s leading exporter of coltan, although it does have it among its natural resources?

The Congolese bishops clearly described this state of affairs in a Note published at the end of a pastoral mission in the east of the country, particularly in the dioceses of Goma, Butembo-Beni and Bunia, from January 14 to 26, 2021: “Many argue that the nature of the conflict in this area is neither intra- nor inter-communal, but rather a strategy of occupation of land or the balkanization of the country. However, others believe that there are, to some extent, aspects of an inter-communal conflict as a result of the sudden and massive arrival of populations called Banyabwicha, who speak Kinyarwanda, and populations from Uganda who do not speak any local language. This situation prolongs the chaos and desolation affecting innocent citizens.”[9]

As is usually the case in similar conditions, the most exposed and most affected are women and children. A 2013 study in the American Journal of Public Health revealed that approximately 1.8 million Congolese women had been raped at least once in their lives.[10] An estimated 19.6 million will be in need of assistance and protection in 2021. What is even more outrageous in the face of this extreme suffering is that for several decades the country has been the subject of humanitarian attention aimed at improving the living conditions of its population. Despite these efforts, Congo remains one of the least developed countries on the planet, and its population is considered among the poorest in the world. Should we not go beyond indignation and ask ourselves about the internal and external factors that contribute to making these appalling conditions prevalent? Why do armed conflicts continue in the Congo?

Avoiding a misunderstanding

International media point the finger at ethnic and tribal conflicts when accounting for the violence in the Congo. This is a misunderstanding that must be avoided at all costs. In fact, any careful observer of Congolese history will agree that the recurring wars in the DRC are not only due to local conflicts between clashing tribes. It is true that this happens often, but it cannot be the only reason for ongoing warfare, when we know that it has killed more than 6 million inhabitants of the Congo in about 20 years.

In our view, ordinary citizens are neither filled with hatred of their neighbors nor responsible for ethnic conflicts. They commit acts of violence only when they are prompted by the real yet invisible architects of conflict: elites who manipulate racial or ethnic identities in their struggle for political and economic power. This largely explains the escalation of violence, whereby inactive and desperate young people readily enlist in armed groups, hoping to make money in mineral-rich areas.

The ineffectiveness of humanitarian aid

It should be noted at the outset that the failure of humanitarian aid in the DRC has been little studied and does not seem to interest analysts or philanthropic organizations. Yet Congo-Kinshasa over the past two decades has received a great deal of humanitarian aid. One study showed that the country receives an average of USD1.5 billion in aid each year.[11]

Even so, Lumumba’s country has increasingly deteriorated. Is it not a victim of what 2015 Nobel Prize-winning economist Angus Deaton calls the “aid illusion,” the idea that more money will improve the situation?[12]

This illusion is confirmed by the annual reports published by the United Nations. In its description of DR Congo, the OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) states that “persistent underfunding remains the greatest obstacle to a humanitarian, effective and timely response in the DRC. In 2020, only 36 percent of the budget required for the humanitarian response plan was mobilized. Efforts will have to be doubled this year to meet the full range of urgent needs.”[13] Clearly these statements seem to imply a causal link between the unresolved crisis and the funding gap.[14] Yet the problem is much deeper than that described by these UN reports.

Considering the long-term impact of humanitarian aid on a state’s ability to fulfill its duties to its citizens, Deaton writes, “Large inflows of foreign aid change local politics for the worse and undercut the institutions needed to foster long-term growth… Aid also harms democracy and civic participation, which is a direct loss, in addition to the losses associated with weakening economic development.”[15]

Humanitarian aid and the law of the strongest

It should also be noted that, in general, humanitarian aid is never immune to misappropriation, corruption and/or favoritism. A study conducted by the Canadian Research Partnership Network on Philanthropy showed that in the DRC nearly one-third of aid is diverted, and yet those benefiting go unpunished.[16] We know that in order to divert attention and avoid public scrutiny, the exploiters, who live in accessible areas or large towns, receive the best quality aid; the others, the truly needy, receive only the crumbs. In the eyes of those who commit such crimes, those for whom relief is particularly intended are “individuals without rights and therefore willing to naively submit or make do, as long as they have access to water, food and other essential goods.”[17] As a result, what should be a humanitarian issue in the DRC has become the arena of the “law of the strongest.”

In this time of pandemic, we must also recognize that the governments giving aid are spending huge amounts of money to prop up their own economies. This also makes us wonder, “to what end are they coming to help us?” In any case, the truth, which is difficult to accept, is this: Congo’s dependence on humanitarian aid constitutes one of the greatest limits to its development, because it hinders the process of reconstruction of the state. Moreover, as we have seen, humanitarian aid in the DRC is today at the mercy of profiteers, especially because it is considered a favor and not a right.

It must also be said that the responsibility for the failures of humanitarian aid in the DRC lies not only with the organizations, but also with the Congolese government, which is plagued by corruption that is generally not talked about.

This raises some questions: “Why do international donors care so little that their aid is diverted? Why continue to help, when it is known that certain governments do not want the tragedy that affects their people, and for which they are responsible in some way, to be made known? What justifies this philanthropy, when NGOs are accused of tarnishing the image of countries in order to get noticed and make money?”

These questions on humanitarian aid to DR Congo introduce us to the issue concerning the MONUSCO mission (United Nations Mission for Stabilization in the DRC). More than 10 years have passed since the UN promoted this peace mission, but armed groups continue to control large parts of North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri, creating an insecure situation and terrorizing the population, especially women and girls. Just as the billions of dollars invested in an attempt to stabilize and strengthen peace in the DRC have yielded only disappointing results, so too MONUSCO seems to beAngus Deaton calls the “aid illusionfailing.

MONUSCO under scrutiny

When people ask, “What have the blue helmets been doing in the Congo since 1999?” the first answer that comes to mind is, “protecting civilian populations.” Yet the security problem in the Congo continues to worsen. All analysts acknowledge that MONUSCO’s colossal funding in the Congo – $1.45 billion in 2013-14, for about 20,000 troops – makes it the most important and expensive UN operation in our time.[18] At the time of its creation, “its role was limited to monitoring the cessation of hostilities, the disengagement and withdrawal of foreign forces, and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid.”[19]

The subsequent evolution of MONUSCO has been an expansion of responsibilities. In this long inventory of tasks, it goes without saying that the protection of civilians should be the most obvious, but, in reality, it is the most difficult to achieve. Hence the exasperation of the Congolese population, which is asking nothing more of the peacekeepers than to leave. The Congolese, tired of the endless killings, accuse MONUSCO of a strange passivity in the face of the massacres of the civilian population. In fact, certain activities of this mission in the field of human rights is far from satisfying the Congolese, especially since some of its members have been guilty on several occasions of illegal activities, human rights violations and non-compliance with their code of conduct on sexual matters.[20]

A few years ago, an image posted on Twitter showed a white armored vehicle, with the UN insignia, containing bags of coltan, a mineral that is at the center of armed conflicts in the eastern part of the DRC.[21] It was dated the morning of October 7, 2018, in Benin, in the Kivu region. All the clues in the image suggested something unpleasant. To throw smoke in the eyes of inquirers, MONUSCO spokesperson Florence Marchal wanted to give the impression that they were bags containing sand mistaken for minerals. Do UN soldiers use sandbags to protect themselves during operations?[22] The blue helmets are also accused of being in league with rebel movements or of exchanging weapons for valuable resources such as gold and diamonds.

However, it should not be forgotten that one of MONUSCO’s greatest achievements remains the logistical support it provides during electoral sessions, protecting more than 500 polling stations, sometimes in areas difficult to access.[23] But these positive actions are little compared to the daily extortions of the rebels and, unfortunately more and more often, of the soldiers of the national army.

When one considers the demands of young Congolese in the face of the impotence of the peacekeeping forces, one realizes that this discontent is due, in large part, to the disproportionate expectations that aid from the international community raises in the population that are then disappointed.

But one must also consider the commitment of the Church.[24] What is the Catholic Church doing in the face of this dramatic situation in the Congo? We will not examine here in detail the initiatives taken by the Congolese episcopate in the ordinary life of the country. We only want to show how, in a complex and confused tangle of socio-political issues, the Congolese bishops are  holding up the evangelical values of peace, justice, solidarity, freedom and human dignity. And this happens even at the cost of their lives, as demonstrated by the cruel murder, on October 29, 1996, of Jesuit Christophe Munzihirwa, archbishop of Bukavu (a city on the border with Rwanda, which welcomed thousands of refugees after the Rwandan genocide of 1994).

The Church: the conscience of a country on the brink of collapse

In the DRC, the Catholic Church finds itself involved in the political arena. It works to ease tensions and defuse crises, taking care not to offend the political class or discourage citizens. It intervenes because the Congolese State fails to provide adequate education, health and public services. For this reason, in the history of the country, it has been accused of colluding with the opposition. But the Congolese bishops, faithful to their mission of evangelization, have never shied away from denouncing attacks on human rights and democracy.

This prophetic courage has often led to regrettable incidents and serious consequences, including the exile of Cardinal Joseph-Albert Malula to Rome because of the tug-of-war between the Church and President Mobutu, and the assassination of Archbishop Munzihirwa due to his stance, as pastor of the Church of Bukavu, regarding the flow of Rwandan refugees who had arrived there since 1994. “His action in favor of the refugees was threefold. He visited them in person in the refugee camps to understand the extent of their suffering and to console them; then he mobilized funds to help them meet their needs; finally, he engaged in actions to defend their rights both nationally and internationally, to draw the world’s attention to this tragic situation.”[25]

This boldness is what Pope Francis calls parrhesia, that is, “an incitement to evangelization that leaves a mark in this world.”[26] Indeed, Archbishop Munzihirwa did not build ideological walls that separate ethnic groups, but worked to build bridges that encourage and unite.[27] However, this negotiated and non-violent solution has been rejected in favor of a military solution: the war of 1996 (resumed in 1998), and the desire to plunder the nation’s natural resources. With his advocacy for justice and truth, Archbishop Munzihirwa was a nuisance in the eyes of some and had to be eliminated.

We must also remember that in the Congo many lay Christians have shed their blood to defend the dignity of the human person and respect for freedoms and fundamental rights. Among them we mention two in particular: Thérèse Kapangala, a young woman preparing to enter religious life, killed on January 21, 2018, while protecting a child during anti-Kabila marches that were bloodily repressed by the Congolese army; and Rossy Mukendi Tshimanga, killed by the police on February 25, 2018, during a peaceful demonstration in the parish of Saint Benoît, in the municipality of Lemba, Kinshasa.

This bloodshed certainly irrigates the seed of Christians, as Tertullian said. But an important question remains: how to pacify the Congo? Even supposing that the Congolese army eliminates all the negative forces that sow terror in the east of the country, how can the authorities govern well if nepotism and corruption continue to infect the political class like a cancer?

How can we overcome the ‘impasse’?

Therefore, it seems that the time has come to develop a new approach to restore peace in the DRC and to adopt new methods of thinking and working to bring about structural changes. In our opinion, all stakeholders should be brought together in the framework of a broad “inclusive dialogue for peace” (DFP), bringing together representatives of all sections of the population, all regions and the diaspora, similar to the Sovereign National Conference of 1990-92. The main objective of this DFP should be to make a serious analysis of the causes of conflicts. Participants should be not only local political and administrative authorities, but also community leaders, business leaders, civil society representatives and religious leaders. Congolese women should also be involved in this major exchange.

Among the key issues to be addressed, two in particular should capture the attention of participants. First, the division and management of political power. Congo is a country where tribal and/or ethnic affiliation is a fundamental identity reference, and where democracy mainly takes the form of an excluding competition between different communities, thus depriving the democratic process of any substance. In such a context, the manipulation of ethnic identity is a very effective strategy in the struggle for power, but also in the continuation of internal conflict. It is necessary to think about an agreement that can establish new rules capable of facilitating a balanced distribution of power.

The second issue is the return of refugees and displaced persons. Great consideration must be given to this, so as not to reignite armed conflicts and exacerbate inter-community tensions. Participants should reflect on how best to facilitate the reintegration of returnees, or those who have acquired refugee status, or foreigners who have formed families with Congolese partners. Inclusive dialogue for peace should promote a culture of regional cooperation. Do we need to recall that the Congo has much to gain by recognizing its dependence, if not its strong ties, with its neighboring countries?

However, we must be under no illusions and be aware that an inclusive dialogue for peace is not a panacea. Our approach is valid to the extent that it recognizes the power of the Congolese to chart their own course to a bright future, thus ending the cycle of imported solutions that have revealed their limitations.

Moreover, dialogues and consultations are essential to the life of a civilized nation, as they foster free and calm debate to reach a compromise on political reforms or other issues of national interest. This is what the Congolese bishops have always maintained, and it is in the light of this perspective that the late Cardinal Laurent Monsengwo Pasinya, then Archbishop of Kisangani, presided over the memorable National Sovereign Conference (NSC), the results of which deserve to be studied again in order to implement inclusive dialogue for peace.

In concluding this reflection, we would like to respond to all those who wonder about the future of this Congo, tossed about by so many vicissitudes. The country will not die, it will live. The hope of a better and prosperous Congo, more beautiful than before, is still possible. But for this belief to become a reality and get the country out of this impasse, it is important that the Congolese themselves become aware of the responsibility that falls on them in this situation. This awareness should motivate them to work assiduously to radically transform Congolese society, to create opportunities for the entire population to take charge of itself once and for all. We must have the courage to change the course of history so that from the scorched soil of these wars the new shoots will be the strongest, the greenest, the brightest and the most fruitful.

DOI: La Civiltà Cattolica, En. Ed. Vol. 5, no. 8 art. 1, 0821: 10.32009/22072446.0821.1

[1].    Cf. S. Kandolo, “Les violences sexuelles en milieu urbain: cas de la ville de Lubumbashi, République Démocratique du Congo”, in Santé Publique 29 (2017/1) 125-131.

[2].    Cf. N. Tshiani, La force du Changement, Paris, Éditions du Panthéon, 2016, 11f.

[3].    The Congo River is 4,700 km long. It is the second longest river in Africa, after the Nile (6,695 km).

[4].    Patrice Emery Lumumba became the Prime Minister of the DRC after the country’s independence in 1960. He was assassinated a few months after taking office, on January 17, 1961. His tragic death provoked a strong international reaction and contributed to making the Congolese leader a national hero in the DRC and an icon of Pan-Africanism and the history of African independence.

[5].    See F. Ngolet, Crisis in the Congo: The Rise and Fall of Laurent Kabila, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, 3; 14.

[6].    Cf. ibid.

[7].    The Congolese Union for Democracy (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie, RCD), created in Goma and Bukavu (eastern Congo), was supported by Rwanda. Later, in September 1998, Congolese businessman Jean-Pierre Bemba created a second rebel group, the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo, MLC), supported by Uganda. A few months later, the discord between Rwanda and Uganda caused a split in the RCD. Two movements were created: the RCD-Goma (RCD-G), supported by Rwanda, and the RCD-Kisangani / Liberation Movement, supported by Uganda.

[8].    C. Braeckman, “La ‘première guerre mondiale africaine’”, in Le Soir +
(https://plus.lesoir.be//art/la-premiere-guerre-mondiale-africaine-_t-20010120-Z0K566.html#), January 20, 2001.

[9] .   Congo National Episcopal Conference, Arrêtez de tuer vos frères (www.cenco.org/arretez-de-tuer-vos-freres).

[10].   See F. Maertens de Noordhout, “Violences sexuelles en République démocratique du Congo: ‘Mais que fait la police?’”, in Revue interdisciplinaire d’études juridiques, Vol. 71, No. 2, 2013, 213-241.

[11].   Quoted in C. Seymour, The Myth of International Protection: War and Survival in the Congo, Oakland, CA, University of California Press, 2019, 66.

[12].   Cf. ibid.

[13].   OCHA, “About OCHA DRC,” at www.unocha.org/democratic-republiccongo-drc/about-ocha-drc

[14].   See OCHA press release, “The Single Largest Impediment to the Humanitarian Response in DRC is Underfunding”
(www.unocha.org//story/single-largest-impediment-humanitarian-response-drc-underfunding-un-humanitarian-chief).

[15].   Quoted in C. Seymour, The Myth of International Protection: War and Survival in Congo, op. cit., 67.

[16].   Cf. V. M. Nshurani, “L’aide humanitaire au gré des prédateurs en RDC”, in PhiLab (https://philab.uqam.ca/blogue-accueil/international/laide-humanitaire-au-gre-des-predateurs-en-rdc), January 4, 2019.

[17].   Ibid.

[18].   Cf. X. Zeebroel, “La Mission des Nations Unies au Congo: le Léviathan du maintien de la paix”, in Cahiers africains 76 (2009) 139.

[19].   Ibid., 142.

[20].   Cf. G. H. Lonsi Koko, Mais quelle crédibilité pour les Nations Unies au Kivu?, Paris, L’Atelier de l’Egrégore, 2019, 28; 30.

[21].   Cf. J. Ndinga Ngoma, “Des images qui pourraient embarrasser la Monusco”, in Africanews (https://fr.africanews.com/2018/10/09/rdc-des-images-qui-pourraient-embarrasser-la-monusco), October 9, 2018.

[22].   Cf. G. H. Lonsi Koko, Mais quelle crédibilité pour les Nations Unies au Kivu?, op. cit., 31.

[23].   Cf. X. Zeebroel, “La Mission des Nations Unies au Congo: le Léviathan du maintien de la paix”, op. cit., 140.

[24].   It must be recognized that other religious denominations contribute in various ways to sustaining Congolese society. But here we are speaking above all of the Catholic Church.

[25].   R. Kyungu, La liberté intérieure comme fruit du discernement spirituel: Tentative d’un portrait spirituel du Serviteur de Dieu Monseigneur Christophe Munzihirwa, SJ, Archevêque de Bukavu (1926-1996), Kinshasa, Editions Loyola, 2021, 184; 186.

[26].   Ibid., 168.

[27].   See ibid., 155.